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Introduction
The notion of convexity for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games) was introduced by Shapley (1971) and is one of the most analysed properties in cooperative game theory. Many economic and combinatorial situations give rise to convex (or concave) cooperative games, such as airport games (cf. Littlechild and Owen (1973) ), bankruptcy games (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1985) ) and sequencing games (cf. Curiel et al. (1989) ).
Convexity for TU-games can be defined in a number of equivalent ways. One of these is by means of the supermodularity property, which has its origins outside the field of game theory. Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981) have extended this property towards cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU-games) to define ordinal and cardinal convexity, respectively. The supermodular interpretation of convexity also plays an important role in the context of effectivity functions (cf. Abdou and Keiding (1991) ).
Economically more appealing than this supermodular interpretation of convexity are the definitions of convexity that are based on the concept of marginal contributions. In cooperative games with stochastic payoffs, this marginalistic interpretation of convexity has already been succesfully applied (cf. Timmer et al. (2000) and Suijs (2000) ). For NTU-games, however, such an extension has not yet been made. In this paper, we define three new types of convexity for NTU-games, which are based on three corresponding marginalistic convexity properties for TU-games.
Although all five convexity properties for NTU-games coincide within the subclass of TU-games, this is not the case in general. In this paper we analyse the relations between these convexity concepts. In addition, we investigate the convexity properties in special classes of NTU-games, such as hyperplane games, 1-corner games and bargaining games.
Convex TU-games have some nice properties. In this paper we focus on three of these: for convex TU-games, the Shapley value belongs to the core, semi-convexity is satisfied and the bargaining set coincides with the core. We find that semi-convexity can be extended to NTU-games in such a way that it is satisfied if either of the five convexity notions holds. It is shown that the first property can be extended to NTU-games that satisfy the three marginalistic convexity properties in some classes of NTU-games. We show that the third property cannot be extended for general NTU-games. This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce some notation and basic definitions. In Section 3, three new types of convexity for NTU-games are introduced. In Section 4, we investigate how the various types of convexity are related and in Section 5, we look at some specific classes of games. Finally, in Section 6, we relate the different types of convexity to various solution concepts for NTU-games.
Notation and Basic Definitions
The set of all real numbers is denoted by R, the set of nonnegative reals by R + and the set of nonpositive reals by R − . For a finite set N, we denote its power set by 2 N = {S | S ⊂ N} and its number of elements by |N|. By R N we denote the set of all real-valued functions on N. An element of R N is denoted by a vector x = (x i ) i∈N . For S ⊂ N, S = ∅, we denote the restriction of x on S by x S = (x i ) i∈S .
For x, y ∈ R N , y ≥ x denotes y i ≥ x i for all i ∈ N and y > x denotes y i > x i for all
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or TU-game, is described by a pair (N, v) , where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players and v : 2 N → R is the characteristic function, assigning to every coalition S ⊂ N of players a value v(S), representing the total payoff to this group of players when they cooperate. By convention, v(∅) = 0.
An allocation of v(S) is a vector x ∈ R S such that i∈S x i ≤ v(S), with x i representing the payoff to player i ∈ S. An allocation x of v(S) is called Pareto efficient if i∈S x i = v(S). The core C(V ) is the set of Pareto efficient allocations of v(N) for which it holds that no coalition S ⊂ N has an incentive to split off:
An ordering of the players in N is a bijection σ : {1, . . . , n} → N, where σ(i) denotes which player in N is at position i. The set of all n! permutations of N is denoted by Π(N). The marginal vector of a TU-game (N, v) corresponding to the order σ ∈ Π(N) is defined by
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A cooperative game with non-transferable utility, or NTU-game, is described by a pair (N, V ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players and V is the payoff map assigning to each coalition S ⊂ N, S = ∅ a subset V (S) of R S such that, for all
and for all S ⊂ N, S = ∅ we have V (S) is nonempty, closed and convex, V (S) is comprehensive, i.e., x ∈ V (S) and y ≤ x imply y ∈ V (S),
In addition, we assume that (N, V ) is monotonic: for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N, S = ∅ and for all x ∈ V (S) there exists a y ∈ V (T ) such that y S ≥ x. Note that we do not define
class of NTU-games with player set N is denoted by NT U N . For ease of notation, we sometimes use V rather than (N, V ) to denote an NTU-game. NTU-games generalise TU-games. Every TU-game (N, v) gives rise to an NTU-
The set of Pareto efficient allocations for coalition S ⊂ N, S = ∅, denoted by P ar(S), is defined by
its set of weak Pareto efficient allocations W P ar(S) is defined by W P ar(S) = {x ∈ V (S) | @ y∈V (S) : y > x} and its set of individually rational allocations is defined by
The imputation set of an NTU-game (N, V ), denoted by I(V ), is defined by
The core of an NTU-game (N, V ) consists of those elements of V (N) for which it holds that no coalition S ⊂ N, S = ∅ has an incentive to split off:
This definition of superadditivity is a straightforward generalisation of the concept of superadditivity for TU-games. In addition, we define a weaker property concerning only the merger between individual players and coalitions rather than between two arbitrary coalitions. An NTU-game (N, V ) is called individually superadditive if for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊂ N\{i}, S = ∅ we have
Note that individual superadditivity is stronger than monotonicity. We define the marginal vector m σ corresponding to the order σ ∈ Π(N) by
for all k = 1, . . . , n. Note that we use the assumption of monotonicity to ensure that the sets over which the maximums are taken are nonempty. By construction, M σ (V ) ∈ W P ar(N). If a game is individually superadditive, then all marginal vectors belong to IR(N).
Convexity
A TU-game (N, v) is called convex if it satisfies the following four equivalent conditions (cf. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) ):
Condition (3.1), which is called the supermodularity property, was originally stated in Shapley (1971) as the definition of convexity for TU-games. Subsequently, Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981) generalised this property to ordinal and cardinal convexity for NTU-games, respectively. An NTU-game (N, V ) is called ordinally convex if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that S = ∅, T = ∅ and for all x ∈ R N such that x S ∈ V (S) and x T ∈ V (T ) we have
A game is called cardinally convex if for all coalitions S, T ⊂ N such that S = ∅, T = ∅ we have
In contrast with these supermodular definitions of convexity by Vilkov (1977) and Sharkey (1981) , we define three new types of convexity for NTU-games, based on the marginalistic properties (3.2)-(3.4). First of all, we define coalition-merge convexity 1 , which generalises property (3.2). For U = ∅ and S = T , (3.2) is trivial and these cases can therefore be ignored when defining an analogous property for NTU-games. If S = ∅, (3.2) is equivalent to superadditivity. Because we do not define V (∅) for NTU-games, we require superadditivity as a separate condition. For S = ∅, (3.2) states that for any coalition U, the marginal contribution to the larger coalition T is larger than the marginal contribution to the smaller coalition S. In terms of allocations, this can be interpreted as follows: given the situation in which coalitions S and T have agreed upon a weak Pareto efficient and individually rational allocation of v(S) and v(T ) (say, p and q, resp.), if coalition U joins the smaller coalition S, then for any allocation r of v(S ∪ U) such that the players in S get at least their previous amount (r S ≥ p), it is possible for U to join the larger coalition T using allocation s of v(T ∪ U), which gives the players in T at least their previous amount (s T ≥ q) and makes all players in U better off than in case they join S (s U ≥ r U ). Using this interpretation of (3.2), we can now define an analogous property for NTU-games. An NTU-game (N, V ) is called coalition-merge convex, if it is superadditive and it satisfies the coalition-merge property, i.e., for all U ⊂ N such that U = ∅ and all S $ T ⊂ N\U such that S = ∅ the following statement is true: for all p ∈
Note that it makes no differences whether we require the coalition-merge property for all q ∈ V (T ) or only for q ∈ W P ar(T ) ∩ IR(T ). The extension of (3.3) towards NTU-games goes in a similar manner: an NTU-game (N, V ) is called individualmerge convex if it is individually superadditive and it satisfies the individual-merge property, i.e., for all k ∈ N and all S $ T ⊂ N\{k} such that S = ∅, the following statement is true: for all p ∈ W P ar(S)∩IR(S), all q ∈ V (T ) and all r ∈ V (S ∪{k}) such that r S ≥ p there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}) such that
And finally, an NTU-game (N, V ) is called marginal convex if for all σ ∈ Π(N) we have
One important aspect of the five convexity properties defined in this section is that within the class of NTU-games that correspond to TU-games, they are all equivalent and coincide with TU-convexity. Another property of these concepts is the following: if an NTU-game (N, V ) satisfies some form of convexity, then all its subgames do, where the subgame of (N, V ) with respect to coalition S ⊂ N, S = ∅ is defined as the NTU-game (S, V S )
Relations between the Five Types of Convexity
In this section we investigate the relations between the five types of convexity for NTU-games that were presented in the previous section. For 2-player NTU-games, all five types are equivalent to (individual) superadditivity, as is shown in Proposition 4.1. For general n-player NTU-games, equivalence between the five types of convexity does not hold. The remainder of this section shows which relations do exist between these properties.
The following proposition states an implication, which follows immediately from the definitions of coalition-merge and individual-merge convexity.
The following Example shows that the reverse need not be the case.
Example 4.3 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
This game is not superadditive and therefore not coalition-merge convex 2 : take
. This game does, however, satisfy individual-merge convexity. First, individual superadditivity can easily be checked to be satisfied. Next, let k ∈ N,
. If |T | = 3, we have T ∪ {k} = N. Because i∈T q i ≤ 2 and r k ≤ 1 (which follows from |S| ≤ 2), we have i∈N s i ≤ 3 and hence, s ∈ V (N). If T = {1, 2} or T = {3, 4}, we have |S| = 1 and r k ≤ 0 and because of individual superadditivity, s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}). Finally, for other coalitions T with |T | = 2, we have max i∈T q i ≤ 0, r k ≤ 1 and therefore s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}). Hence, this game satisfies the individual-merge property.
In the following lemma, we show that individual-merge convexity implies marginal convexity.
it is marginal convex.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is individual-merge convex and let σ ∈ Π(N). To simplify notation, assume without loss of generality that σ(i) = i for all i ∈ N. We prove that M σ (V ) ∈ C(V ) by induction on the player set. For this, we define for k = 1, . . . , n
has an incentive to leave the "grand" coalition N k . Define T = {1, . . . , k − 1} and let S $ T, S = ∅. Then it is sufficient to show that coalitions S, T , {k}, T ∪ {k} and S ∪ {k} have no incentive to split off:
The same argument holds for coalition T .
• Player k will not deviate on his own, because individual-merge convexity implies individual superadditivity and hence,
•
and hence, the "grand" coalition T ∪{k} has no incentive to deviate.
• Finally, we show that coalition S ∪ {k} has no incentive to split off. Define
according to which the players in S get at least the amount they get according to the marginal vector
the basic assumptions of an NTU-game that R is closed and bounded, so if R = ∅, we can compute max{r k | r = (r S , r k ) ∈ R}. Let r ∈ R be a point in which this maximum is reached. Because
. Let p be the intersection point of the line segment between 0 and M σ S (V k ) and the set W P ar(S) ∩ IR(S). By construction, r ∈ V (S ∪ {k}) is such that r S ≥ p.
. As a result of individual-merge convexity and comprehensiveness, there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ {k}) such that s T = q and
, it follows from the construction of
We constructed r k as the maximum amount player k can obtain by cooperating with coalition S, while giving each player i ∈ S at least M σ i (V k ). We conclude that there does
From these four cases we conclude
In Example 4.5 we show that the reverse implication of Proposition 4.4 need not hold.
Example 4.5 The following game with player set N = {1, 2, 3} is the NTUanalogon of Example 4.6 in Timmer et al. (2000) , which is a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs:
The marginal vectors of this games are stated in the following table, where σ = (a, b, c) is shorthand notation for σ(1) = a, σ(2) = b and σ(3) = c. , 6, 0) and the core is given by
It is easy to check that M σ (V ) ∈ C(V ) for all σ ∈ Π(N) and hence, (N, V ) is marginal convex. Next, we show that this game is not individual-merge convex. Take k = 1, S = {2}, T = {2, 3} and take p = 0 ∈ W P ar(S) ∩ IR(S), q = (6, 0) ∈ V (T ) and r = (3, 0) ∈ V (S ∪ {k}). Note that r S ≥ p. Suppose (N, V ) is individual-merge convex. Then there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪{k}) such that (3.8) holds, i.e., s 2 ≥ 6, s 3 ≥ 0 and s 1 ≥ 3. But s ∈ V (T ∪{k}) implies
≤ 1, which gives a contradiction. Hence, (N, V ) is not individual-merge convex.
In the following example we show that ordinal convexity is not implied by any of the other four types of convexity.
Example 4.6 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
First, we show that this game is not ordinally convex. Consider S = {1, 2, 3}, T = {2, 3, 4} and x = (4, −3, 3, 4) ∈ R N . Then we have both x S ∈ V (S) and x T ∈ V (T ), but neither x S∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ) nor x S∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). Hence, (3.5) is not satisfied and (N, V ) is not ordinally convex. Next, we show that (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex. Let U ⊂ N, U = ∅ and let S $ T ⊂ N\U such that S = ∅. Let p ∈ W P ar(S) ∩ IR(S), let q ∈ V (T ) and let r ∈ V (S ∪ U) such that r S ≥ p. Define s = (q, r U ). If |T | = 3, then i∈T q i ≤ 4 and r U ≤ 3. If |T | = 2 and |U| = 2, then i∈T q i ≤ 2 and i∈U r i ≤ 4. In both cases, we have i∈T ∪U s i ≤ 7 and hence, s ∈ V (T ∪ U) = V (N). In case |T | = 2 and |U| = 1, we have i∈T q i ≤ 2 and r U ≤ 1 and hence, i∈T ∪U s i ≤ 3, implying s ∈ V (T ∪ U). Noting that (N, V ) is superadditive, we conclude that this game is coalition-merge convex, and because of Propositions 4.2 and 4.4, also individual-merge and marginal convex. Finally, we show that (N, V ) is cardinally convex. Let S, T ⊂ N such that S = ∅, T = ∅ and let
satisfied. If S ∩ T = ∅, (3.6) follows from superadditivity. We distinguish between three further cases. First, if |S| = |T | = 3, then |S ∩ T | = 2 and S ∪ T = N.
and define x as before. Then i∈S∪T x i ≤ 2 + 4 − 0 = 6 and hence, x ∈ V • (S ∪ U).
Third, if |S| = |T | = 2, then |S ∩ T | = 1 and |S ∪ T | = 3. Take x S∩T = (0, 0, 0, 0) ∈ V • (S ∩ T ) and define x as before. Then i∈S∪T x i ≤ 2 + 2 − 0 = 4 and hence,
. From these three cases we conclude that (N, V ) is cardinally convex.
Next, we prove that ordinal convexity does not imply any of the other four types of convexity.
Example 4.7 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
This game (N, V ) is ordinally convex: let S, T ⊂ N such that S = ∅, T = ∅ and let
x ∈ R N such that x S ∈ V (S) and x T ∈ V (T ). We distinguish between four cases:
if S ⊂ T or T ⊂ S, (3.5) is trivially satisfied. If S ∩ T = ∅, (3.5) is equivalent to superadditivity, which is satisfied by this game. If S = {1, 2} and T = {1, 3}, then x 1 ≤ 0 and hence, x S∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ). Otherwise, i∈N x i ≤ 2 and hence, x S∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). From these four cases we conclude that (3.5) is satisfied and (N, V ) is ordinally convex. However, this game is not marginal convex, because the marginal vector corresponding to σ = (1, 2, 3), M σ (V ) = (0, 2, 0), does not belong to the core, because player 1 and 3 have an incentive to leave the grand coalition. Using Propositions 4.2 and 4.4, we conclude that (N, V ) is neither coalition-merge nor individual-merge convex. Furthermore, this game is not cardinally convex: (0, 2, 0) ∈ V • ({1, 2}) and (0, 0, 1) ∈ V • ({1, 3}), but (0, 2, 0) + (0, 0, 1) = (0, 2, 1)
The example below shows that cardinal convexity does not imply any of the marginalistic types of convexity.
Example 4.8 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3, 4}:
For the cardinal property (3.6), only the case with S = {1, 2, 3} and
Hence, x ∈ V (N) and (N, V ) is cardinally convex. For σ = (1, 2, 3, 4) we have M σ = (0, 1, 1, 0). ) ∈ V ({1, 2, 4}) gives them a strictly higher payoff. Hence, M σ (V ) / ∈ C(V ) and (N, V ) is not marginal convex. Using Propositions 4.2 and 4.4, we conclude that (N, V ) is neither coalition-merge nor individual-merge convex.
Finally, we show that the three marginalistic convexity properties do not imply cardinal convexity.
Example 4.9 Consider the following NTU-game with player set N = {1, 2, 3}:
This game is a 1-corner game (see Section 5.2) and it follows from Proposition 5.4 that (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex (and hence, individual-merge and marginal convex as well). This game is, however, not cardinally convex: take S = {1, 2}, T = {2, 3} and take
Summarising Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 and Examples 4.3 to 4.9, the five types of convexity for NTU-games are related as is depicted in Diagram 1. An arrow from one type of convexity to another indicates that the first one implies the second one.
Where an arrow is absent, such an implication does not hold in general.
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Diagram 1
The results in Diagram 1 hold for general n-player NTU-games. Some of the counterexamples that we used to show that certain implications do not hold, however, are games with four players. So, to round off this section, we state the relations between the five types of convexity for 3-player NTU-games in Diagram 2. The corresponding proofs and examples can be found in the appendix. To keep the picture clear, the arrows from cardinal convexity to ordinal and marginal convexity have been omitted.
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Special Classes of Games
In this section, we look at our convexity notions in some specific classes of NTUgames.
Hyperplane Games
A hyperplane game is an NTU-game (N, V ) such that for all coalitions S ⊂ N, S = ∅ we have
Note that every entry of a S must be positive to ensure boundedness of V (S) ∩ R S + . We denote the class of all hyperplane games with player set N by H N . A property of hyperplane games that we are going to use later on, is that these games possess a convex core.
Proof: Let a S , b S for all S ⊂ N, S = ∅ be as in the definition. Then
C(V ) is the intersection of a finite number of halfspaces and a convex set and is hence convex.
A parallel hyperplane game is a hyperplane game (N, V ) such that the projection of a N onto
• ∆ S equals a S for all coalitions S ⊂ N, S = ∅. We denote the class of parallel hyperplane games with player set N by P N .
Lemma 5.2 Let (N, V ) ∈ H N . If (N, V ) is individually superadditive, then it belongs to P N .
Proof: Assume that (N, V ) is individually superadditive and let a S , b S for all S ⊂ N, S = ∅ be as in the definition. Let S ⊂ N, S = ∅. Take p ∈ V (S) and let
, where e j and e i are unit vectors in R S . Then
for all α ∈ R and hence, p α ∈ V (S). Next, define q α = (p α , 0 N\S ) for all α ∈ R.
Applying individual superadditivity |N\S| times yields q α ∈ V (N). Hence,
The inequality can only hold for all α ∈ R if the expression between parentheses equals zero. Therefore
The following lemma relates the five convexity properties within the class of parallel hyperplane games.
Lemma 5.3 Within P N , coalition-merge, individual-merge, marginal, ordinal and cardinal convexity coincide.
Proof: First of all, note that all five convexity properties are scale invariant: if (N, V ) satisfies some form of convexity, then so does (N, V w ) for every vector of
In a parallel hyperplane game (N, V ), we can choose w in such a way that (N, V w )
corresponds to a TU-game. From this the assertion follows.
The relations between the various forms of convexity for hyperplane games are summarised in Diagram 3. For simplicity, the double arrow between cardinal and ordinal convexity and the arrow from cardinal to marginal convexity have been omitted. It follows from Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3 that within the class H N , coalition-merge, individual-merge, ordinal and cardinal convexity coincide. Because there are hyperplane games that are marginal convex, but not parallel, marginal convexity is weaker than the other four convexity notions.
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1-Corner Games
An NTU-game is called a 1-corner game if
S for all S ⊂ N, S = ∅. We denote the class of 1-corner games with player set N by C N . Monotonicity implies that for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N, S = ∅ we must have
From this, superadditivity readily follows.
The core of a 1-corner game is given by (cf. Otten (1985) ):
In the following lemma we show that all 1-corner games are coalition-merge convex.
Proof: Let U ⊂ N such that U = ∅, let S $ T ⊂ N\U such that S = ∅ and let
. Because of monotonicity, we have q ≤ u
It can be shown in a similar fashion that every 1-corner game is ordinally convex. However, a 1-corner game need not be cardinally convex, as is illustrated by Example 4.9.
Bargaining Games
A bargaining situation is a pair ( 
Solution Concepts
In this section we investigate how some solution concepts for NTU-games relate to our convexity notions. 
The MC-Value
The marginal based compromise value or MC-value was introduced in Otten et al. (1998) and is defined as
where then it is easily seen that the core includes the set on the right hand side of (5.10), from which MC(V ) ∈ C(V ) follows.
The Compromise Value
The compromise value is introduced in Borm et al. (1992) and is an extension of the τ -value for TU-games (Tijs (1981) ). The compromise value is a compromise between two payoff vectors. The first one is the utopia vector K(V ), defined by
The second one is the minimal right vector k(V ), defined by
for all i ∈ N, where ρ S i (V ) is the remainder for player i after giving the other members in S their utopia payoff:
The following lemma comes from Borm et al. (1992) .
In view of Lemma 6.2, every NTU-game with a nonempty core is compromise admissible. For a compromise admissible game, the compromise value T (V ) is defined by
where
This definition extends the definition of semi-convexity for TU-games in Driessen and Tijs (1985) 3 . In TU-games, semi-convexity is implied by convexity and the next lemma states the corresponding result for NTU-games.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is marginal convex. Let i ∈ N and let σ ∈ Π(N) be such that σ(1) = i. By construction, M σ i (V ) = 0. Because of Lemma 6.2, we have
We conclude that k i (V ) = 0 for all i ∈ N and (N, V ) is semi-convex.
As a corollary, we obtain the following proposition, in which compromise admissibility follows from nonemptiness of the core.
compromise admissible and the compromise value is proportional to the utopia payoff vector.
The Bargaining Set
The (Maschler) bargaining set for an NTU-game (N, V ) is defined as (cf. Aumann and Maschler (1964) )
The bargaining set consists of those imputations x such that whenever player i raises an objection against player j by cooperating with coalition S and promising the members of S more than they get according to x, player j can counter this objection by cooperating with coalition T , giving each player in S ∩ T at least the amount they are promised by i. It is a well-known result that in TU-games, this set is always nonempty and contains the core. For convex TU-games, the bargaining set coincides with the core (cf. Solymosi (1999) ). In NTU-games, the bargaining set still contains the core, but there are games in which M(V ) is empty. In the next example we show that even a strong form of convexity does not ensure that M(V ) = C(V ).
Example 6.5 Consider the same game as in Example 4.9, which is coalition-merge convex. The imputation x = ( , 1) does not belong to the core, but we show that x ∈ M(V ). By symmetry, we only have to look at objections of player 1 against player 3. Player 1 cannot object on his own, but only through coalition S = {1, 2}. The maximum payoff vector player 1 can promise is y = (1, 1). But player 3 can counter this objection through coalition T = {2, 3} and payoff vector z = (1, 1). Hence, x ∈ M(V ) although x / ∈ C(V ) and (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex.
Of course, there might be some subclass of NT U N for which coalition-merge convexity (or even a weaker form of convexity) implies M(V ) = C(V ). The proof in Solymosi (1999) for the corresponding TU-result uses excess games and it might be interesting to investigate how this result can be extended to NTU-games, and in particular, what definition of excess games can be used in this context.
A Appendix
In this appendix we give the proofs and examples that relate the five convexity properties for 3-player NTU-games. First, we prove that in 3-player NTU-games, individual-merge convexity implies coalition-merge convexity.
Proposition A.1 Let (N, V ) ∈ NT U N such that |N| = 3. If (N, V ) is individualmerge convex, then it is coalition-merge convex.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is individual-merge convex. Then (N, V ) is individually superadditive, and because there are only three players, superadditive. For the coalition-merge property, if |U| = 1, then (3.7) is equivalent to (3.8). For |U| > 1, we cannot find coalitions S and T such that S $ T ⊂ N\U and S = ∅. Hence, the coalition-merge property is satisfied.
Next, we show that in 3-player games, coalition-merge convexity implies ordinal convexity.
Proposition A.2 Let (N, V ) ∈ NT U N such that |N| = 3. If (N, V ) is coalitionmerge convex, then it is ordinally convex.
Proof: Assume (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex. Let S 1 , S 2 ⊂ N such that S 1 = ∅ and S 2 = ∅. If S 1 ⊂ S 2 or S 2 ⊂ S 1 , then (3.5) is trivially satisfied. If S 1 ∩ S 2 = ∅, (3.5) is satisfied because (N, V ) is superadditive. Otherwise, let x ∈ R N such that x S 1 ∈ V (S 1 ) and x S 2 ∈ V (S 2 ) and suppose x S 1 ∩S 2 / ∈ V (S 1 ∩ S 2 ). Then x S 1 ∩S 2 > 0 because |S 1 ∩ S 2 | = 1. Next, define U = S 2 \S 1 , S = S 1 ∩ S 2 and T = S 1 and take p = 0 ∈ W P ar(S) ∩ IR(S), q = x S 1 ∈ V (T ) and r = x S 2 ∈ V (S ∪ U). Now r S = x S 1 ∩S 2 > 0 = p. Because (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex, there exists an s ∈ V (T ∪ U) = V (N) such that s ≥ (q, r U ) = (x T , x U ) = x S 1 ∪S 2 . Hence, x S 1 ∪S 2 ∈ V (N) = V (S 1 ∪ S 2 ) and (N, V ) is ordinally convex.
The following example shows that in 3-player NTU-games, marginal convexity need not imply ordinal convexity. This game is marginal convex. For ordinal convexity, consider S = {1, 2}, T = {2, 3} and x = (1, 1, 1) ∈ R N . Then we have both x S ∈ V (S) and x T ∈ V (T ), but neither
x S∩T ∈ V (S ∩ T ) nor x S∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). Hence, (N, V ) is not ordinally convex.
Finally, we show that in 3-player games, cardinal convexity implies coalition-merge convexity. (s S , s T \S ) ≥ (r S + q S , q T \S ) ≥ q and s U = r U . So s satisfies (3.7) and (N, V ) is coalition-merge convex.
